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Conflict of interest as a barrier to local accountability 
1. Introduction 
That public sector accountability is a prerequisite for development is no longer a matter for 
debate.
2 However, the question of how to build and sustain accountability efficiently in 
developing countries remains largely unanswered. Governments need to establish well defined 
rules, benchmarks and penalties, but how and by whom these would optimally be applied is 
not yet clear.  
Especially since its promotion by the World Bank (2004), the idea of increasing the 
involvement of citizens in the process of holding public servants to account has received 
considerable attention. Focusing specifically on the point at which public servants deliver 
services directly to citizens, the rationale behind this idea is straightforward; citizens are (1) the 
ultimate beneficiaries of publically provided services and (2) best placed to know how well or 
badly their public service providers are performing. So, if appropriately informed about what 
they should expect from their public service providers, how best to monitor those providers 
and what they can do if they find those providers lacking, then by acting in their own best 
interest, citizens will facilitate an improvement in accountability and public service provision.  
While this rationale appears well founded, recent randomized interventions designed to 
empower, inform and train citizens to hold public service providers to account have been only 
variably successful. In Uganda, Bjorkman & Svensson (2009) found that a community-health-
clinic monitoring programme substantially improved clinical staff attendance and health 
outcomes. In Kenya, Duflo et al. (2009) found that training communities to monitor and assess 
teachers led to a small improvement in the performance of centrally appointed teachers and a 
larger improvement in the performance of teachers who were locally appointed and paid out of 
community donations rather than the public purse. However, also in Kenya, de Laat et al. 
(2008) found that a program designed to strengthen ties between school committees and local 
educational authorities through training and joint meetings and under which school committees 
could award prizes increased committee activity and led to the election of more educated 
committee members but had no effect on teacher performance. In Uttar Pradesh, Banerjee et 
al. (2008) found that neither informing communities about the quality of local schools and what 
they should expect from schools, nor training communities to monitor and assess school 
performance had any impact on either levels of community involvement in holding schools to 
account or school performance.
3  And interim results from an ongoing randomized, controlled 
trial of a ‘Whole School Development’ program in Gambia, which provides training and cash 
grants to head teachers and Parent Teacher Association representatives, find no positive 
impacts – and even some evidence of negative impacts – on teacher preparedness and pupil 
learning (Blimpo and Evans 2010a,b).   
                                                            
2 According to Lewis and Peterson (2009) holding public officials/service providers to account involves rendering 
them “answerable for processes and outcomes and imposing penalties if specified outputs and outcomes are not 
delivered”. 
3 By contrast, Banerjee and co-authors do find significant, positive effects from a third intervention, in which they 
trained community members to run reading camps.   2 
 
So, should we be investing in local accountability systems that rely on citizen involvement or 
should we take another look at top-down systems in which public servants are monitored and 
held to account by other public servants?
4 Olken’s (2007) comparison of community 
monitoring and top-down government auditing of locally managed road construction projects in 
Indonesia indicated that the latter could be significantly more effective at deterring resource 
expropriation. However, little discretion was afforded to the government auditors within the 
context of the study. Kremer and Chen (2001) afforded considerable discretion to Kenyan 
headmasters when inviting them to monitor and report teacher attendance so that bicycles 
could be awarded to those with good attendance records and, in contrast to Olken’s 
government auditing, this top-down monitoring system failed unequivocally; all of the 
headmasters indicated that all of their subordinate teachers had sufficiently good attendance 
records to deserve a bicycle, while independent verification revealed otherwise (see also 
Kremer and Holla 2009 for a discussion). However, in this case, we do not know how well the 
communities served by the teachers would have performed in the monitoring role.  A recent 
field experiment by Pradhan and co-authors (2011) finds no effect of providing grants and 
training to school management committees, but finds positive test-score impacts both of 
increasing ‘linkages’ between school management and village government in Indonesia and of 
enforcing the election of school management committee members.  However, compliance with 
assignment to elections was extremely low (48%), and the election intervention actually 
decreased teacher presence. Moreover, the impacts of linkages arise not from improved 
accountability of teachers – teachers actually report less frequent use of rewards and sanctions 
by principals under the linkage intervention – but rather from direct educational interventions 
by village council members. What constitutes an effective accountability intervention and who 
should be charged with the duty of holding teachers to account remain open questions.   
In general, the effectiveness of delegating authority to alternative stakeholders will depend not 
only on their access to a technology for rewarding or sanctioning behavior (such as control over 
bonuses, or hiring and firing powers), but also on their access to information about school 
performance and on their willingness to use their enforcement technologies in order to hold 
teachers to account for this performance.  Institutional reforms can aim to shift authority across 
actors, or to change these parameters for particular actors.  A difficulty in drawing lessons from 
existing field experiments for the design of accountability reforms stems from the fact that they 
typically do not allow researchers to attribute observed effects – whether good or bad – to 
induced differences in technology, information, or preferences. 
                                                            
4 Barrera-Osorio and co-authors (2009) provide a comprehensive review of available evidence on reforms to 
decentralize school management more generally, drawing together a total of 14 very diverse studies.  These 
reforms include instances of ‘administrative’ (management) or ‘professional’ (teacher) control, and varying degrees 
of delegated authority.  Barrera-Osorio (2009, p. 104) conclude that the “dearth of evidence on the impact or 
effectiveness of SBM in practice”, arising from the limited number of experimental or well-identified quasi-
experimental studies, precludes strong statements about impacts in general or the design of school-based 
management in particular.  More recently, Khattri and co-authors (2010) use non-experimental methods to find 
small, positive test-score impacts of a school-based management program that provided discretionary funds and 
training to head teachers in the Philippines, and Lassibille and co-authors (2010) find limited evidence of positive 
learning impacts of an experimental intervention intended to improve the professional management of schools in 
Madagascar..    3 
 
In this paper, using data from a specially designed lab-type experiment conducted in the field 
we undertake a direct comparison of the decisions made by community representatives and 
two types of public servants when empowered to hold Ugandan primary school teachers to 
account.
5 The use of a lab-type experiment allows us to control and standardize the conditions 
under which each of the three types of stakeholder are operating; in effect, we hold the 
sanctioning technology and information environment constant across the three stakeholder 
types.  Doing so allows us to isolate the role of the as yet unexplored variable in accountability 
systems, namely the inherent willingness of different stakeholder types to engage in the act of 
holding public service providers to account. 
Within the experiment, each stakeholder was afforded a considerable degree of anonymity 
when making his or her decisions. Each started out with an identical money endowment and 
faced an identical monetary cost of holding a teacher to account, and each observed and 
responded to an identical set of possible teachers’ actions. Thus, any differences in the 
observed willingness of the community members and two types of public servant to hold the 
teachers to account can be attributed to differences in the level of satisfaction they derive from 
causing a public servant whose behaviour falls short of the acceptable level to be penalized.  
At the outset, we conjectured that this level of satisfaction and the corresponding willingness to 
hold teachers to account would vary systematically depending on how socially proximate the 
stakeholder was to the teacher and to those who stood to benefit if a teacher was effectively 
held to account. Social proximity to the teacher results in a conflict of interest in the sense that 
the level of satisfaction derived from causing a teacher who underperforms to be penalized is 
reduced by the dissatisfaction of causing a relative, colleague or friend to be penalized. In 
contrast, social proximity to those who stand to benefit if a teacher is effectively held to account 
increases the level of satisfaction. Kremer and Chen’s (2001) finding is consistent with 
headmasters being subject to a conflict of interest owing to their social proximity to subordinate 
teachers. Olken’s (2007) finding is consistent with community members being subject to a 
conflict of interest owing to their social proximity to local project managers and government 
auditors not being subject to such a conflict. However, in neither case can we exclude 
alternative explanations. Within the lab-type experiment reported below, alternative 
explanations are excluded, to the extent possible, by design.   
The downside of using a lab-type experiment is that the findings may not generalize to the 
context of specific interest. This problem, referred to as the problem of external validity, is 
inextricably related to the control that the method affords the researcher. However, steps can 
be taken to enhance and, in some cases, investigate external validity.   
Our experimental design has several unique features aimed at enhancing the external validity of 
our findings. The experiment was conducted in one hundred Ugandan primary schools, each 
of which has a School Management Committee (SMC) that is charged with the duty of holding 
                                                            
5 Barr, Lindelow, and Serneels (2009) compared the willingness of appointed and elected individuals to hold 
service providers to account in a lab-type experiment. However, all of the roles in the experiment were played by 
trainee nurses in Ethiopia, i.e., within the experiment both the role of the service provider being held to account 
and the role of the holder to account was taken up by trainee nurses. Within the experiment reported here, actual 
Ugandan teachers are held to account by individuals who are charged with the very same duty in everyday life.  4 
 
the teachers to account.
6 Each SMC is comprised of several representatives of parents (elected) 
and of the school’s ‘foundation body’ (appointed) and two distinct types of public servant, 
centrally appointed representatives of the District Education Office and sub-county 
government, and the school’s headmaster.
7 Thus, in each school, we were able to undertake the 
comparison of interest, while matching the relational structure, i.e., who is holding whom to 
account in whose interest, of the experiment to the relational structure of the school 
accountability system.  
The lab-type experiment involved a version of Fehr and Fischbacher’s (2004) Third-Party 
Punishment Game (TPG). In this game a first player is invited to divide a sum of money 
between him or herself and a second player. Then a third player can pay to have the first player 
fined either having seen the first player’s division or conditional on the first player making any 
of a number of specified divisions. It is the third players’ behaviour that is of particular interest 
here as, assuming some consensus about what is a fair division, the third players’ fining 
decisions reveal  how willing they are to punish first players who act unfairly towards second 
players. Fehr and Fischbacher’s original experiment involved student subjects. In contrast, we 
invited teachers from the schools described above to divide a sum of money between 
themselves and parents of pupils at the school and a sample of SMC members to decide 
whether and when to fine teachers.  
Aiming to enhance external validity is one thing, presenting evidence of success in this regard is 
quite another. If data generated using a lab or lab-type experiment correlates in expected ways 
with data from nature, it can be taken as evidence of external validity (Guala, 2001, 2002). 
However, in the current context, nature offers no potential correlate to fining in the 
experiment. Ugandan SMCs have no pecuniary powers; they cannot fine or pay bonuses, hire 
or fire. The only tool the SMCs have at their disposal is moral suasion, the use of which in 
nature would be exceedingly difficult to measure. Thus, we are unable to show that what the 
SMC members do in the experiment correlates with what they do in nature. However, we can 
show that the behaviour of the teachers in the experiment is correlated with their behaviour in 
nature and that aspects of the SMCs’ behaviour in nature impact predictably on that 
correlation.  
We find that head teachers are less willing than other SMC members to hold their subordinate 
teachers to account. We find no significant difference between community representatives and 
centrally appointed public servants.   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the design of the lab-type 
experiment. Section 3 presents our analytical framework. Section 4 presents the data. Section 5 
                                                            
6  The laws required to facilitate and regulate these SMCs were put in place soon after the introduction of universal 
primary school education in 1997. Today, every Ugandan primary school has an SMC. However, the SMCs have 
no powers relating to teacher remuneration, hiring or firing and their efficacy is in doubt. When conducting 
surprise visits, Chaudhury et al (2006) found that 27 percent of Ugandan primary school teachers were absent 
from their place of work, a higher percentage than they found absent in all of the five other countries they 
included in their study and could find no correspondence between SMC activity levels and teacher absenteeism.  
7 The foundation body is either a religious entity or the local government. In every case the representatives will be 
local community members. In our sample, 85 of the schools had a religious foundation body. 5 
 
presents the analysis and findings. Section 6 presents our indirect evidence of external validity. 
And section 7 discusses the findings and concludes.     
 
2. Experimental design 
The experiment was conducted in 100 primary schools, 25 randomly selected from the full list 
of primary schools in each of four purposefully selected Ugandan districts. In each school, one 
experimental session was held involving fifteen subjects. The experimental design specified that 
five teachers should be placed in the first player (money dividing) role, five parents of pupils at 
the school in the second player (passive) role, and five SMC members in the third player 
(fining) role. In some schools, five teachers and/or five SMC members were unavailable and so 
the quotas for the affected role or roles had to be made up using other subject types (usually 
pupils’ parents). Thus, in the experiment as a whole, across the 100 schools, 487 teachers were 
assigned to the first player (money dividing) role, 474 SMC members to the third player (fining) 
role, and 500 parents to the second player (passive) role. The distribution of SMC members by 
type is presented in Table 1; 21 percent are head teachers, 17 percent are centrally appointed 
public servants, the remaining 62 percent are community representatives.  
Table 1: Sample of School Management Committee members by type 
      Freq.  Rel. freq. 
Head teacher  100  21.1% 
Centrally appointed public servants (CAPS)  80  16.9% 
Community representatives  294  62.0% 
Foundation body representative  140  29.5% 
Parents' representative  150  31.6% 
Alumni representative  4  0.8% 
Total  474  100.0% 
      
Each experimental session was conducted using a classroom, large enough to seat all fifteen 
subjects and four field researchers, and three decision-making stations located outside the 
classroom and at a sufficient distance to ensure complete privacy during one-on-one meetings. 
Each session proceeded as follows. On arrival, each subject was registered and given a badge 
bearing a number and either an orange, green or blue figure. Parents received badges bearing 
orange figures, teachers, badges bearing green figures, and SMC members, always including the 
head master, badges bearing blue figures. Following registration, each subject was invited to sit 
in an area assigned to their badge colour. Once all the subjects had arrived and were seated, 
one of the field researchers, standing at the front of the classroom, introduced the research 
team and went through a series of formalities relating to ethics and control. Then, before 
describing the experimental games, the presenter invited all those with green badges to raise 
their hands and asked “Am I right in thinking that you are all teachers?” Having received 
confirmation, she or he said “During the workshop I will refer to you as green players.” The 
presenter then went through the same procedure with orange badge wearers, i.e., parents, and 6 
 
blue badge wearers, i.e., SMC members. The aim of this exercise was to ensure that badge 
colours and the roles that the badge wearers assumed in their everyday lives were linked in the 
minds of the participants. This was the only atypical framing applied to the experiment. 
Then the games were introduced. First, the teachers, randomly and anonymously paired with 
p a r e n t s ,  w e r e  e n g a g e d  i n  a  D i c t a t o r  G a m e  ( D G ) .
8
  Then the teachers, randomly and 
anonymously paired with parents (new pairings), and the SMC members, randomly and 
anonymously matched to teacher-parent pairs played the TPG.
 9  There was no feedback 
between games.  
Each game was described using wall mounted visual aids depicting green, orange, and, in the 
case of the TPG, blue figures and moving representations of real Ugandan Shillings about to 
show allocations being made (see Figure 1). Once the subjects had been taught a game, the 
teachers were called to one-on-one meetings with field researchers, where they were taken 
through the game again, tested, and then invited to express their decisions by dividing ten real 
coins between the green figure representing themselves and the orange figure representing the 
parent they had been anonymously paired with on the table in front of them.
10 
Figure 1: Example of the visual aids used to explain the Third Party Punishment Game 
 
                                                            
8 The role of the DG was to supply a measure of teachers’ intrinsic motivations to share with the parents and to 
support an analysis of the external validity of the experiments. In this analysis (reported in full elsewhere), we 
found an inverse correlation between the proportional allocation made by each teacher to a parent in the DG and 
that teachers’ absenteeism rate. We take this as evidence that, for the teachers at least, behaviour in the 
experiments and behaviour in the everyday life of the school are, to some extent, motivated in the same way. The 
teachers’ behaviour in the TPG was not expected to and did not correlate with absenteeism in the same way owing 
to the powers given to the SMC members within the game.  
9 Even though the SMC members were not directly involved in the DG, each was endowed with 2,500Sh. We did 
this to emphasize the passive presence of the SMC members during the DG and to ensure that the SMC members 
did not enter the TPG, feeling under-remunerated. 
10 We had no reason to doubt the literacy and numeracy skills of the teachers. However, we knew that many of the 
parents and some of the SMC members would be illiterate and we wanted the teachers to be in no doubt that the 
parents understood the game and to apply the same protocol to all active subjects. 7 
 
 
In both the DG and the TPG 500, Ugandan Shilling coins were used. So, each teacher was 
invited to divide 5,000 Ugandan Shillings between him or herself and one of the five parents in 
the session.
11 In the TPG each SMC member was initially endowed with 2,500 Ugandan 
Shillings and could pay 500 Shillings to have 1,500 Shillings taken away from the teacher with 
whom he or she was anonymously matched.  
The SMC members’ decisions were elicited using the strategy method. Each was asked whether 
he or she would “pay to fine” or “keep their money and not fine” in the event that the teacher 
allocated 3,500 to the parent and 1,500 to himself, 3,000 to the parent and 2,000 to himself, 
and so on all the way to zero to the parent and 5,000 to himself (eight choices in total). We did 
not ask what they would do if the teacher allocated less than 3,500 to him or herself as this 
either could have led to some teachers having negative net earnings or would have required 
some conditioning of the maths of the game and corresponding further explanation. Mindful of 
the need to keep the games as simple as possible both for the sake of the subjects and the field 
researchers who conducted the experiments, we decided to obviate these complications by 
simply not allowing the blue players to fine green players who allocated less than the value of 
the fine to themselves.
12 Like the teachers, the SMC members received further instruction, were 
tested, and made their fining decisions during private, one-on-one meetings.  
In both games, the players were called to make their decisions in random order. All of the 
experimental sessions were conducted according to a script, drafted in English, translated into 
the principal local language in each of the four districts, and then back translated into English 
by an individual with no prior knowledge of the experimental objectives or design. This allowed 
us to check for consistency across the translations and ensure that no emotive words or phrases 
crept into the scripts. The scripts and protocols are available from the authors on request. 
All of the sessions were conducted by field staff of the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics, from the 
same regions as the schools in which they worked and experienced in making respondents feel 
comfortable in their presence through prior work on household surveys investigating sensitive 
topics such as health outcomes. Further, the paperwork they carried and displayed and the 
identifying badges they wore were designed to indicate that, while they had the permission of 
the Ministry of Education and Sports to conduct the research, they were not in the employ of 
and should not be perceived as monitors sent by the Ministry. 
 
3. Analytical framework 
In the TPG the net benefit to an SMC member of fining the teacher with whom they are 
anonymously matched can be defined as 
                                                            
11 At the time of the experiment, 5,000 Ugandan Shillings was worth just under $3 and corresponded to half a 
day’s pay for the average teacher in our sample. 
12 This was not explained unless players asked about it in one-on-one interviews. Then, they were provided with 
the explanation set out here. 8 
 
   	 
  
  
   (1) 
where  is the total net benefit to  of fining ,  is the internal or psychological benefit to  
of fining , and  is the direct monetary cost to  of fining . So, as  is exogenously fixed at 
500 Shillings, the SMC member’s decision rule is fine if     and who fines and when 
they fine depends on the factors determining. 
The internal benefit to  of fining , , is a function of how far ’s allocation to the parent with 
whom they are matched, , falls short of the acceptable or prescribed level,  	, ’s official 
relationship to , , i.e., whether they are charged with the duty of holding them to account, ’s 
social proximity to or tendency to identify with , 
, and ’s social proximity to or tendency to 
identify with those who stand to benefit if  is effective in holding  to account,    
For a selfish, money-maximizing SMC member, i.e., one that has no regard for others or for 
their official duties, the first term on the right-hand side of (1) is zero. So, the net benefit 
reduces to 
  
 and he or she will never fine.
14  
Now, consider an SMC member with net benefits to fining as defined in (1). Here, we expect 
that the further below the acceptable or prescribed level,  	, ’s action, , falls the greater the 
internal benefit  gets from fining ,      if     	. If ’s action exceeds the 
acceptable level we expect no fining. This expectation is derived from the observation that, 
within the context of a well functioning accountability system, teachers would never be 
penalised for exceeding the acceptable level of performance to the benefit of their 
clients.These conjectures translate into SMC members being more likely to fine teachers who 
allocate less to parents and having fining strategies that are either flat (never fine or fine in the 
case of all allocations to the parent) or monotonic (fine when the parent is allocated zero, do 
not fine when they are allocated 70 percent and switch once in between).  
In addition, if as proposed by Akerlof and Kranton (2000) individuals prefer to act in 
accordance with their identities, the effect of any deviation of  from  	 on the internal benefit 
to  of fining  will be greater if  has assumed holder-to-account-of- as part of his or her 
identity,    , for  that falls short of  	. Conversely, the effect of such deviations 
would be reduced if  and  are socially proximate and doing harm to socially proximate others 
causes dissatisfaction,  
    . Finally, the effect of such deviations would be enhanced 
if  and , i.e., those who stand to benefit from  successfully holding  to account, are socially 
proximate,     . 
This framework can be used to interpret any differences in fining behaviour between the three 
types of SMC member in the TPG. The distinguishing feature of the head teachers is their 
                                                            
13 We denote by a vector to allow for the fact that the exact beneficiary of !’s allocation is unknown to ", but is 
drawn from a set of five potential recipients. 
14 In Fehr and Fischbacher’s (2004) original experiment over 60 percent of the students chose to fine under some 
conditions and in a cross-cultural study using a version of the TPG almost identical to the one use here, market 
integrated subjects in developing countries tended to engage in more fining than students Barr et al (2009).   9 
 
probable social proximity to and tendency to identify with the teachers. If they fine less than 
community representatives and centrally appointed public servants, it can be taken as evidence 
that they are conflicted owing to this proximity. In contrast, we would expect the community 
representatives to identify with the wider community served by the schools. If they fine more 
than the centrally appointed public servants, it will be taken as evidence that this, the premise 
upon which local accountability systems are built, is well founded. Finally, we would expect the 
centrally appointed public servants to be least likely to be socially proximate to or identify with 
either the teachers or the community.  
 
4. Data 
The teachers’ behaviour when placed in the money dividing role gives us some insight into 
what the teachers considered fair and appropriate within the context of the TPG. Figure 2 
presents the distributions of allocations made by the teachers to the parents in the TPG. 
Compared to the allocations that students make in lab-based TPGs, the allocations made by 
the Ugandan teachers are high. This could be owing to the relatively low anonymity in the 
Ugandan game and/or to the subject pools and role matching.
15 The strength of the mode at the 
equal division is particularly striking; 27 percent of the teachers made such a division. Lower 
allocations to parents are made by 56 percent of the teachers and fewer than 15 percent of the 
teachers made higher allocations. These distributions are consistent with the majority of 
teachers considering the equal division to be appropriate and teachers varying with respect to 
the strength of their preference to act appropriately.  
       Figure 2: Distribution of Offers in the Third Party Punishment Game 
 
                                                            
15 See Barr et al (2009) for a comparison of DG and TPG allocations made by Emory students and individuals 




































Though not directly comparable with Fehr and Fischbacher’s data owing to differences in the 
third parties’ choice sets, the Ugandan SMC members appear to be more inclined to pay to 
fine than the original student sample. Only 63 percent of the students paid to fine first players 
who allocated nothing to second players, while over 80 percent of the Ugandan SMC members 
paid to fine teachers who allocated nothing to parents. This notwithstanding, the student’s and 
SMC members fining strategies are similar in one important regard. Like the students, the 
SMC members’ fining strategies indicate that the majority of them considered the equal 
division to be appropriate. Figure 3 plots the mean fining strategies of headmasters, centrally 
appointed public servants and community representatives. The allocations by the teachers to 
the parents appear on the horizontal axis and the proportion of SMC members of each type 
choosing to fine appears on the vertical axis. The SMC members of each type were least likely 
to fine a teacher who divided the money equally between him or herself and the parent.   
Figure 3: Mean fining strategies for a head teacher and a locally elected representative 
 
In general, the strategies also appear to accord with the framework set out above; teachers are 
more likely to be fined the lower their allocations to the parents. However, the plots indicate 
that some chose to fine when the equal division was made, more chose to fine teachers who 
made unequal divisions that favoured the parent than chose to fine the equal division, and 
some chose not to fine in the case of a zero allocation to a parent, but fined in the case of a 10 
percent allocation.  
A closer look at the data reveals that a considerable proportion of the SMC members chose 
fining strategies that are neither flat nor monotonic. In Table 2 the fining strategies are 









































Teacher's allocation to parent (% of stake)
Head teacher
Community representative
Centrally appointed public servants11 
 
members chose strategies that were either flat or monotonic. Within this category, 5 percent 
chose never to fine, 1 percent chose to fine the teacher irrespective of how much he or she 
allocated to the parent, 64 percent chose monotonic strategies involving fining in the case of 
low allocations to the parent and no fining in the case of high allocations, and across all flat or 
monotonic strategies 5 percent chose to fine teachers allocating half or more to the parent. This 
5 percent of SMC members are acting as if they think that the teachers should be allocating 
more than half to the parents.  
Table 2: Consistency in TPG fining strategies 
     
All 





   Community 
representatives 
Monotonic or flat fining 
strategies  71.0% 66.0% 66.3%  73.8% 
involving no fining  5.3%  7.0%  6.3%  4.4% 
monotonic 64.6%  59.0%  56.3%  68.7% 
all allocations (0-70%) fined   1.1%  0.0%  3.8%  0.7% 
Convex fining strategies  8.3% 15.0% 3.8%  7.5% 
Other fining strategies  20.6% 19.0% 30.0%  18.7% 
Observations  474 100  80  294 
Notes: † CAPS = Centrally Appointed Public Servants
 
Just over 8 percent of the strategies chosen were convex, involving no fining in the case of the 
equal division, fining in the case of both zero and 70 percent allocations to parents and two 
switch points. These strategies are consistent with teachers who make high offers being viewed 
as norm violators akin to rate-busters. So, it is a form of holding to account, but not in the 
interest of the schools’ clients. Note that head teachers are considerably more likely than either 
community representatives or centrally appointed public servants to choose a convex strategy. 
We will return to this finding below. 
Finally, almost 21 percent of the strategies are neither monotonic, nor flat, nor convex. These 
strategies could be pure noise - collections of random guesses made by SMC members who did 
not understand the task they were being asked to perform. If this is the case, including them in 
the analysis would reduce statistical power, while excluding them could introduce sample 
selection bias.
16 Alternatively these strategies could be manifestations of alternative rationales or 
consistent decision-making but with some error. If either of these is the case, the strategies are 
informative and should be included in the analysis. We were able to come up with a rationale 
for half of these strategies and observed that a further quarter were either monotonic or convex 
                                                            
16 The rates at which each type of fining strategy is selected vary across types of SMC member. Both Chi-squared 
tests and simple linear probability models with observations clustered by school indicate that community 
representatives are more likely than either type of public servant to choose flat or monotonic strategies and head 
teachers are more likely than either centrally appointed public servants or community representatives to choose 
convex strategies. Finally, after controlling for education and which of the field researchers each SMC member 
met in their private one-on-one meeting, community representatives are less likely than either head teachers or 
centrally appointed public servants to choose apparently random strategies.   12 
 
excepting one possible error. So, throughout the analysis presented below we use the full 
sample of strategies.  
Table 3: School Management Committee Characteristics 
All 





Age in years  7.7 3.8  48.4  48.7 
Female (%)  22.7% 25.8% 28.0%  20.2% 
Years served on SMC  4.2 3.6 4.2  4.4 
Education 
no formal education  0.9%  0.0%  1.3%  1.1% 
incomplete primary education  14.6%  4.3%  20.0%  16.6% 
completed primary education  34.2%  3.2%  45.3%  41.5% 
completed O-level  30.8%  22.6%  32.0%  33.2% 
completed A-level  12.1%  40.9%  1.3%  5.4% 
completed university  3.4%  12.9%  0.0%  1.1% 
holds a diploma or certificate  4.0%  16.1%  0.0%  1.1% 
Completed O-level or higher  50.3%  92.5%  33.3%  40.8% 
Observations  445  93  75  277 
Notes: † CAPS = Centrally Appointed Public Servants
 
Finally in this section, we present the four control variables that we use during our analysis. The 
mean age of the SMC members is 47.7 years (s.d.=11.1), 77 percent are male, 23 percent 
female, 50 percent have O levels or above, and the mean number of years served on the SMC 
is 4.2 (s.d.=4.1). Table 3 suggests and t-tests and simple regressions confirm that the head 
teachers in our sample are significantly younger and more educated and tend to have served for 
fewer years on the SMCs to which they belong.
17 For these reasons and because it is highly 
likely that all three variables are associated with the willingness to hold teachers to account, it is 
important to control for these variables during the analysis even though this restricts the sample 
with which we can work owing to missing observations for 29 of the 474 SMC members who 




Figure 3 suggests that the three types of SMC member may vary with respect to their willingness 
to fine teachers, but only when the teachers are making middle-of-the-range allocations to 
parents. In Table 4 we investigate whether the subtle differences in the fining strategies are 
                                                            
17 All of the other apparent differences in Table 3 are statistically insignificant according to t-tests and simple 
regressions.  
18 The 29 SMC members for whom we have missing characteristics data are statistically indistinguishable from the 
rest of the sample with respect to their fining behaviour. 13 
 
statistically significant by estimating a series of three linear probability models.
19 In each of these 
models we treat each of the eight fining decisions made by each SMC member as a separate 
observation.  The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating that an SMC member 
chose to fine.
20 All three models include school fixed effects, a set of seven dummy variables 
each corresponding to one of the eight possible allocations by a teacher to a parent (a zero 
allocation is the basis for comparison), a dummy identifying the head teachers and a dummy 
identifying the centrally appointed public servants (the community representatives are the basis 
for comparison). Models 2 and 3 also include the SME members’ age, sex, education (a 
dummy indicating that they have completed at least O-levels), and the years they have served 
on the committee. Model 3 also includes 35 interaction terms that are described and discussed 
below. Model 1 is based on the full sample of 3,792 fining decisions. Models 2 and 3 are based 
on the 3,560 fining decisions made by SMC members for whom we have characteristics data. 
In all models the standard errors are clustered at the school level to account for non-
independence within both sessions and SMC members.  
In Model 1 neither of the SMC-member-type dummies bears a significant coefficient and the 
linear restriction test result reported at the bottom of the table is also insignificant.
21 This 
suggests that all three types of SMC member are equally willing to fine teachers. However, in 
Model 2, where we control for the individual characteristics of the SMC members, the 
coefficient on the head teacher dummy becomes highly significant (1 percent level). This 
indicates that, when we compare like with like in terms of sex, age, education, and years served 
on the SMC, head teachers are significantly less willing to hold the teachers to account as 
compared to community representatives. Further, the linear restriction test results reported at 
the bottom of the table indicate that they are also significantly less willing to hold the teachers to 
account as compared to centrally appointed public servants (5 percent level).       
The age of the SMC members, their education, and the years they have served on the SMC 
also bear significant coefficients: willingness to fine declines with age;
22 SMC members who 
have completed at least O levels are more inclined to fine as compared to less educated ones; 
and willingness to fine increases with years spent on the committee.
 23 
In Models 1 and 2, differences in willingness to fine across SMC members can manifest only as 
vertical shifts in the fining strategy. However, Figure 3 indicated that the fining strategies of the 
three types of SMC member diverged most when allocations to parents of 30 and 40 percent 
were being considered. To investigate this further, while continuing to control for the SMC  
                                                            
19 We estimate linear probability models rather than probits or logits because most of our regressors are dummy 
variables and we also wish to account for school fixed effects in almost of the models.    
20 If all of the strategies were flat or montonic or we restricted our analysis to those that are flat or monotonic, we 
could use the minimum unfined allocation as the dependent variable. However, we want to include all of the 
strategies in our analysis to obviate problems of selection bias.  
21 If we restrict the sample to fining decisions made with reference to allocations of 50 percent or less to the 
parents, i.e., to allocations at or below the mode, the coefficient on the head teacher dummies is negative and 
weakly significant (10 percent level). If we restrict the sample to flat and monotonic strategies only, the coefficient 
on the head teacher dummy is negative and weakly significant (10 percent level).  
22 The square of age in years is insignificant when added to the models. 
23 It is worth adding here that when we estimate the models for community representatives only we find no 
difference in fining behaviour between Foundation Body representatives and elected parent representatives.  14 
 
Table 4: Linear probability models of fining with school fixed effects 
Dependent variable = 1 if SMC member (i) chose to fine the teacher (j) 
        Model 1    Model 2    Model 3 
   Coef.  s.e.  Coef.  s.e.  Coef.  s.e. 
CAPS
†  0.016 0.025  0.018 0.026  0.018 0.026 
Head teacher (HT)  -0.021  0.019  -0.060  0.023  ***  -0.008 0.038 
Allocation to parent, aj                   
aj = 10%   -0.013  0.015  -0.016  0.015  -0.015  0.023 
aj = 20%   -0.038  0.017  **  -0.036 0.018  **  -0.065 0.031  ** 
aj = 30%   -0.162  0.023  ***  -0.160 0.024  ***  -0.153 0.036  *** 
aj = 40%   -0.428  0.031  ***  -0.429 0.031  ***  -0.383 0.045  *** 
aj = 50%   -0.768  0.024  ***  -0.764 0.025  ***  -0.746 0.038  *** 
aj = 60%   -0.709  0.028  ***  -0.721 0.027  ***  -0.695 0.039  *** 
aj = 70%   -0.730  0.025  ***  -0.735 0.024  ***  -0.717 0.041  *** 
Age in years      -0.002  0.001  **  0.000 0.002 
Female   0.014  0.020  -0.012  0.035 
Education > O-level  0.050  0.024  **  0.065 0.032  ** 
Years served on SMC   0.004  0.002  * 0.002 0.004 
(aj = 10%) x HT     -0.018  0.042 
(aj = 20%) x HT  -0.033  0.045 
(aj = 30%) x HT  -0.130  0.058  ** 
(aj = 40%) x HT  -0.243  0.068  *** 
(aj = 50%) x HT  0.009  0.052 
(aj = 60%) x HT  -0.024  0.064 
(aj = 70%) x HT        0.086  0.056 
Constant 0.865  0.015  ***  0.844 0.019  ***  0.833 0.024  *** 
School fixed effects   yes  yes  yes 
Observations 3792  3560  3560 
CAPS   HT (p-value)  0.202  0.012**  0.469 
Other sets of interactions included (p-value on joint significance) 
aj dummies x Age  no  no  yes (0.112) 
aj dummies x Female  no  no  yes (0.779) 
aj dummies x Ed. > O-level  no  no  yes (0.305) 
aj dummies x Yrs on SMC  no  no  yes (0.638) 
Notes: Basis for comparison is a male locally elected representative, age 47.7 (sample mean), with no O-
levels, who has sat on the median (in terms of fining) SMC for 4.2 years (sample mean) considering a 
teacher who has allocated zero to a parent; school fixed effects included in all specifications; standard 
errors clustered to account for non-independence at the school level; *** significant at the 1% level; ** 
significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level; † CAPS = Centrally Appointed Public Servants. 
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members’ characteristics, we interacted the allocation-to-parent dummies with the head teacher 
dummy and individual characteristics, i.e., we introduced 35 interaction terms.
24 Within this 
model only one set of interaction terms was jointly significant, namely the interactions between 
the allocation-to-parent dummies and the head teacher dummy (p-value 0.002). The outcome 
is Model 3 in Table 4.  
In Model 3 the uniteracted head-teacher dummy is statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
This tells us that head teachers are just as likely as other SMC members to fine teachers who 
allocate zero to parents. Turning to the interaction terms, the significant coefficients relate to 
allocations to parents of 30 or 40 percent. Head teachers are less likely to fine teachers 
allocating these amounts to parents.  
Figure 4: Predicted fining strategies for a head teacher, a centrally appointed public servant 
(CAPS) and a locally elected representative 
 
Note: Predictions based on Model 3 in Table 4 and relate to a 43.8 year old male with O levels or 
higher who has served for 3.6 years on the median (in terms of fining) SMC.   
To investigate the magnitude of the difference in willingness to fine between head teachers and 
other types of SMC member, in Figure 4 we plot three predicted fining strategies each derived 
from the estimated coefficients in Model 3. These strategies relate to three 43.8 year old (the 
mean for the head teachers) males with O levels or higher who have served 3.6 years (the mean 
for the head teachers) on the median (in terms of fining) SMC, one a head teacher, one a 
centrally appointed public servant, and one a community representative. The plots show that 
                                                            
24 If we also include interactions between the centrally appointed public servant dummy and the allocations-to-
parents dummies in this model they are jointly insignificant (p-value 0.21) and do not significantly alter the 
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the head teacher is 15 percentage points less likely than the other two to fine a teacher 
allocating 30 percent to a parent and 26 percentage points less likely, i.e., half as likely, to fine a 
teacher allocating 40 percent.    
Table 5:  Linear probability models of convexity in fining strategies 
Dependent variable = 1 if SMC member (i) chose a convex strategy
Sample All   
Monotonic, flat    
and convex    All   
Monotonic, flat   
and convex 
   Coef.  s.e.  Coef.  s.e.  Coef.  s.e.  Coef.  s.e. 
CAPS
† -0.018  0.037  0.010  0.047  -0.019  0.049  0.010  0.039 
Head teacher  0.075  0.031 **  0.107 0.038  * 0.065 0.046  **  0.090 0.038  ***
Age in years        -0.001  0.002  -0.001  0.001 
Female   -0.023  0.043  -0.034  0.034 
Education  
(O-level or above)            0.001 0.005  0.001  0.004 
Years served on 
SMC               0.007 0.041  0.009  0.034 
Constant 0.072  0.016  ***  0.082 0.019  ***  0.075 0.028  ***  0.085 0.024  ***
School fixed 
effects included  yes    yes    yes    yes 
Observations 474  376  445  358 
Notes: Basis for comparison is a male locally elected representative, age 47.7, with no O-levels, who has 
sat on the median (in terms of fining) SMC for 4.2 years; school fixed effects included in all 
specifications; standard errors clustered to account for non-independence at the school level; *** 
significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level; † CAPS = Centrally 
Appointed Public Servants. 
 
Finally, before discussing and drawing conclusions from our results, it is useful to return to the 
finding reported in section 4 above, that head teachers are more likely than either centrally 
appointed public servants or community representatives to choose convex strategies, involving 
no fining in the case of the equal division, fining in the case of both zero and 70 percent 
allocations to parents and two switch points. In Table 4, the interaction terms indicate no 
significant difference between head teachers and other SMC members in terms of their 
willingness to fine teachers who allocate 60 or 70 percent to parents. However, in this analysis 
no distinction is made between decisions to fine such high allocations that are made within the 
context of flat or monotonic strategies on the one hand and convex strategies on the other. So, 
in Table 5, we present four linear probability models each taking a dummy variable equal to 
o n e  i f  a n  S M C  m e m b e r ’ s  f i n i n g  s t r a t e g y  i s  c o n v e x  a n d  z e r o  o t h e r w i s e  a s  t h e  d e p e n d e n t  
variable. All four models include school fixed effects and the two SMC member-type dummies. 
Models 2a and 2b also include the SMC members’ characteristics. Model 1a is based on the 
entire sample of SMC members, Model 1b is based on the sample of SMC members who 
chose either flat or monotonic or convex strategies, Model 2a is based on the sample of SMC 
members for whom we have characteristics data and Model 2b is based on the intersection of 
the samples used in Models 1b and 2a. The coefficient on the head teacher dummy variable is 17 
 
positive and significant in all four models and indicates that head teachers are around twice as 
likely as other SMC members to choose a convex strategy.  
          
6. Discussion and conclusion 
The analysis of the experimental data generated one null and two significant findings: 
community representatives and centrally appointed public servants are indistinguishable with 
respect to their willingness to hold teachers to account; head teachers are significantly less 
willing to hold teachers to account and only half as willing as other SMC members when the 
teachers’ allocations to parents are only marginally below the generally accepted benchmark 
allocation of 50 percent; and head teachers are twice as likely to choose convex fining strategies 
in which they fine teachers making either low or high allocations but not teachers making the 
benchmark allocation.  
We have located and determined the magnitude of the difference between head teachers and 
other SMC members within the context of the experiment. However, it remains to be seen 
whether and how this might translate into a difference in behaviour within the context of the 
school. By design, the experiment excludes a number of important factors, including any 
reputational concerns associated with making and acting on accountability-related decisions 
when others are watching. In addition, in the experiment the teachers were dividing a sum of 
money between themselves and a parent of a pupil, whereas in everyday life they are deciding 
how much time and effort to put into teaching pupils.  Further research is required to establish 
whether and how these factors interact with the preferences investigated here.  
With these caveats, our results do suggest that the head teachers’ conflict of interest affects their 
behaviour in precisely the range where it matters most in the Ugandan education system.   
Suppose, following the data, that we take the equal division as the generally accepted 
benchmark for teachers’ behaviour in the TPG. Then, the head teachers are performing least 
well relative to other SMC members when teachers’ behaviour falls between 20 and 40 percent 
below the benchmark, whereas all SMC members show an equal willingness to punish extreme 
underperformance. Now, recall that Chaudury et al (2006) found an average 
underperformance rate in terms of attendance of 27 percent among Ugandan primary school 
teachers. So, if we assume a direct correspondence between teachers’ underperformance rates 
in the experiment and in the school context, we find that the head teachers perform least well 
relative to other SMC members in precisely the conditions under which they need to perform 
to redress the current situation.  
Now consider the finding that head teachers are twice as likely as other SMC members to 
choose convex fining strategies. A teacher who allocates 70 percent to a parent and then gets 
fined earns zero from the TPG. This is a harsh punishment and the motivations behind it need 
to be understood. To deter teachers from allocating more to parents is not in the interests of 
the parents and, in monetary terms at least, it is not in the interests of the finer either. However, 
if we view such fining as the punishment of norm violators akin to rate-busters, an alternative 
motivation comes into view. Elster (1989) argued that the punishment of rate-busters by co-18 
 
workers could be viewed as serving the collective interests of the workers; if one worker out 
performs the rest the employer might choose to take that worker’s performance as the 
benchmark against which to evaluate them all. Chaudhury and co-authors (2006) find that, 
across a range of countries, head teachers are more likely to be absent than their subordinates, 
which suggests that they may have particularly strong incentives to maintain a norm of imperfect 
attendance.  This insight, combined with our finding that head teachers are twice as likely as 
other SMC members to choose convex fining strategies, suggests that some head teachers 
identify strongly with their subordinate teachers and care about their collective interests.  
In many instances, having a head teacher who is socially proximate to and identifies strongly 
with his or her subordinate teachers is a good thing, especially if the head teacher is also a good 
leader; it could support coordination and cooperation among the staff of the school. However, 
our findings indicate that head teachers are not ideal holders to account.   19 
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